login: decode the unified-login cookie through ecore
instconf: one reading of this instance's origins
deps: the ecore packages of the third uplift
deps: auxilia whose scribe.Err reads the whole error chain Until now scribe.Err type-asserted the outermost error for slog.LogValuer, so a culpa error under a single fmt.Errorf logged as a flat string and lost its code, hint and stacktrace with no warning. It walks the chain now, which is what makes the culpa wrapping in this service visible in the journal.
service: wrap the merge and reject failures with culpa Three sites, all of them the outermost wrap on an error that becomes a 500: the merge path's non-staleness arm, the reject path's default arm, and the merged-but-the-row-did-not case, whose remedy now rides on the error as a hint instead of sitting in a sentence one wrap away from being buried. Outermost is the whole criterion. scribe.Err type-asserts the error it is handed for slog.LogValuer rather than searching the chain, so a culpa error with an fmt.Errorf above it logs as a plain string and the stacktrace is lost — which is also why the sentinel arms stay fmt.Errorf: they carry no cause worth a stack, and their text is what a 404 or 409 shows a viewer. errors.Is and errors.As traverse culpa's wrap, so the sentinel mapping in the surfaces is unchanged.
logging: log through slog and scribe rather than stdlib log sr-ht-ecore's panic middleware now reports through log/slog, and it reports through the *default* logger — nothing can hand a middleware in another module this service's *slog.Logger. So the daemon's scribe handler becomes the one install point, and the packages that were still calling log.Printf go through the default logger too: the read plane's render and encode failures, its 5xx mapping, and the credential resolver's fail-closed line. Each carries the fields that used to be interpolated into the sentence — method, path, status, page, doc — and the error itself through scribe.Err. The handler grows what it was missing: file:line, because most of what reaches it is a failure and 'which of the six render sites' is the first question; colour dropped when stderr is not a terminal; and the masks. This daemon handles the unified-login cookie and tokens.sr.ht working tokens, and a struct logged whole is how a live credential outlives its own request in a log file — masking in the handler covers the log line nobody reviewed as well as these. cmd/specsrht-migrate keeps stdlib log on purpose: it is a one-shot CLI whose 'specsrht-migrate: ...' progress an operator reads at the terminal during an upgrade, and log.Fatalf is its error exit.
deps: bump sr-ht-ecore for the slog panic reporter middleware now reports a recovered panic through log/slog with method, path, panic and stack as fields instead of one stdlib log line. It logs through the default logger, which is the next commit's business.
graph: seed the test keyset from ecoretest The same fernet-key-and-webhook-seed TestMain the web package had, and the same reason to delete it: ecore's keys are constants, so both packages of this service can install them without the second rotating what the first sealed with.
web: draw the whole web tier from sr-ht-ecore The chrome moved last time; this moves the four packages around it. pages discovers the page templates and carries the shared error body, so the hand-maintained page list, the render helper and error.html go; assets finds the hashed stylesheet and serves the static tree, so the local regexp, the href glob and handleStatic go; middleware brings the private-cache policy and a panic guard that aborts a connection rather than appending an error page to a truncated one; and ecoretest replaces the hand-built config and the TestMain that minted its own keys. The one that matters is csrf. The guard was a predicate three handlers remembered to call, which made unprotected the default for any form added later. It is now csrf.Require on the router, so it covers the routes that are not written yet, it runs before routing — an unrouted POST is refused rather than 404'd — and the refusal is the shared sentence. Host comparison becomes case-insensitive, which is strictly more permissive and only for an operator typo in the config. threads.html becomes _threads.html, the partial spelling pages.Load discovers, and the review page takes container-fluid: two prose columns do not fit the centred container, which is what cover and dolt already concluded for their wide views. What stays here: the sentinel-to-status mapping in fail, and a renderError that wraps ecore's error body in this service's view struct.
web: draw the chrome from sr-ht-ecore The nav/service-switcher, the login block, the environment banner and the brand were this service's own copy of code compare.sr.ht had already copied from somewhere else. They come from sourcecraft.dev/bigbes/sr-ht-ecore/chrome now: one chrome.Service built at startup from the shared config.ini, one chrome.Page per request, embedded in viewData so the shared partials find their fields on the dot. web/chrome.go is gone — buildNav, navItem, canonIndex, the login/logout/ profile URL building and the chrome half of viewData with it. The layout renders srht-env-banner and srht-nav instead of the local markup, the landing page's space list renders through srht-repo-list, and the template FuncMap starts from chrome.Funcs() (the local shortsha was a duplicate of the shared one). sameOrigin and the login redirect ask the chrome for our origin rather than keeping a second copy that could disagree with the links on the page. Three of ecore's policies differ from what this service did, and win, per that package's own doc: [sr.ht]site-name defaults to "sr.ht" rather than "sourcehut" and [sr.ht]environment to "development" rather than "production" when the key is absent, and the brand carries a fixed 15rem min-width so the switcher starts at the same x on every service. The instance's config.ini sets both keys, so on it only the brand width is visible. The nav tests that only restated ecore's rules — switcher order, the paste/pages/hub exclusion, the shape of a login URL — are dropped; ecore tests those. What is left covers this service's seam: that the identity authn resolved is the one the chrome is handed.
authn: remove the local agent-token plane The agent_token table and everything that minted, verified, listed or revoked it. Agent credentials are tokens.sr.ht working tokens now: signed, expiring, owned by a meta.sr.ht account and carrying grants, verified locally by sr-ht-ecore's bearer package. One door, and nothing behind it — a credential the instance plane refuses is refused, where it used to be offered to a second store that might say yes. DEPLOY GATE: do not deploy this until every agent configured with the shared secret holds a tokens.sr.ht token with spec:propose (spec:read to read). Migration 0005 drops the table, migrate-on-upgrade runs it on deploy, and deploying early locks out every agent at once — including the SSH push path. hooks/ no longer reads agent_token directly. The push path goes through the same authn.Resolver the HTTP surfaces use and demands spec:propose, because a push by an agent is a proposal by another transport. The refs rule and the provenance requirement are untouched on both counts: a universal grant is still only an agent to the receive path, and X-Agent / X-Agent-Session are still mandatory on every agent write. bearer.ErrNotOurs is now a permanent refusal. A meta.sr.ht PAT used to fall through to the local store and miss there; with no store to fall through to it earns a 401 rather than the 503 an unclassified error would. [tokens.sr.ht] origin becomes a required config key: with no issuer there is no credential to check, so the daemon fails startup instead of serving reads and refusing every agent write one request at a time. /tokens redirects to the daemon that issues (tokens SPEC ch. 7).
authn: accept tokens.sr.ht working tokens beside the agent token A second agent credential plane, next to the existing one rather than in place of it. The agent_token table, every agent configured with it, and the refs rule and provenance requirement around it are untouched; the local plane is removed in a later phase, not this one. The resolver tries the instance plane first and falls back to the local store on exactly two refusals, bearer.ErrInvalid and bearer.ErrNotOurs. spec's local token has no prefix to discriminate on — it is 32 random bytes in base64, which is precisely what "did not decode as one of ours" looks like — so the fallback replaces the shape test bench and cover can afford. ErrRevoked, ErrForbidden and ErrUnavailable are terminal: a withdrawn credential must not get a second chance at the old door, and an unreachable daemon must not silently degrade into the legacy plane. Grants ride on the principal and are checked where the action is known, never in the middleware, which runs upstream of the router: spec:propose in service.Propose, below both write surfaces, and spec:read in each read surface's gate. /mcp checks per tool rather than at its Gate, because one endpoint carries both kinds and a surface-wide read grant would refuse a propose-only token at initialize. Principal.Authorize is a no-op off the instance plane, which is what keeps the local token working. The instance plane brings an owner where the local token had none, so a working token belonging to anybody but [sr.ht] owner-name is refused rather than admitted as a second identity: Principal.Owner is read by the provenance committer, the refs rule's principal kind and the coreauth AuthContext, all written for one human. StatusFor is the one status table. ErrUnavailable is 503 and never 401 — reading "I could not ask tokens.sr.ht" as "revoked" would refuse every live instance token while a daemon that is deliberately off the hot path restarts. An instance with no [tokens.sr.ht] section builds no instance plane and starts anyway, serving its own agent token as before.
web: git.sr.ht-style dashboard and unified nav brand Adopt the family look the dolt service already has. The nav brand becomes circle icon + site name + red service label (dropping the hub-origin variant), matching every other service on the instance. The logged-in index turns into the two-column dashboard: a sidebar with the service blurb, review-queue/agent-tokens block buttons and the search form, and the spaces as shared-theme event-list cards. The big in-page h2 lives on only for anonymous visitors, where the nav has no user context yet.
ci: cache the assembled scss tree Move the cacher bootstrap to the first task and assemble the shared sourcehut scss partials in ~/scss behind a cache keyed by CORE_VER+BOOTSTRAP_REV. On a hit the build no longer talks to git.sr.ht or github.com at all, so their outages can't fail it; a pin bump misses and reassembles from source as before.
fix(apk): keep -modcacherw when overriding GOFLAGS The GOFLAGS="-trimpath" passed to make clobbers abuild's default GOFLAGS, dropping -modcacherw: the module cache then extracts read-only and the CI cache tarball made from it fails to unpack on the next build (mkdir into 0555 dirs, permission denied — warm build #267). The poisoned gomod tarball was deleted by ad-hoc job #268.
ci: cache Go module and build dirs via cacher Same scheme as sr-ht-dolt (dbd8638 there): restore ~/go/pkg/mod and ~/.cache/go-build from the Garage docker-cache bucket before abuild and seed them back after, keyed by go.sum via cacher (go.bigb.es/cacher). GOCACHE/GOMODCACHE are re-pinned inside build() because abuild redirects them into its throwaway $tmpdir and an upstream typo in abuild.in clobbers any pre-set GOMODCACHE with GOCACHE's value.
ci(apk): build CSS against core 0.84.5 Tracks the srht deployment's SRHT_CORE_VER bump (unified project nav added scss/nav.scss and reworked dark.scss). BOOTSTRAP_REV unchanged — the bootstrap submodule did not move between 0.83.8 and 0.84.5.
feat(web,service): the owner mints and revokes agent tokens in a browser Issuing a credential required SSH to the host, which made the remote agent write plane unusable from anywhere else: to hand an agent a token the owner had to be at the machine. /tokens is that page — list, mint, revoke — behind the same owner-only gate and same-origin guard as approve/reject. The mint is owner-only, and that rule is what revocation depends on: an agent allowed to mint would survive having its own credential revoked by issuing itself another, and "revoke the token" is the entire incident response this design has. An agent asking for the page gets 403 rather than the read plane's login redirect — it is authenticated already, so bouncing it to meta would answer a question it did not ask. The plaintext is rendered in the response to the POST rather than after a redirect. A redirect would either drop the secret or carry it in a URL, where it lands in history and in every proxy log on the way; the cost is that a reload re-submits and mints a second token, which is one click to revoke on that same page, whereas a lost token is not recoverable. service.IssueAgentToken/ListAgentTokens/RevokeAgentToken hold the ACL and the mint, and `specsrht token` now goes through them too, so the CLI and the page cannot drift into two ideas of what issuing a token is. spec-ejq.3
chore(beads): file spec-rsb and spec-ovo, the two admin commands
feat(cmd): agent tokens and host-side proposals get admin commands Two entry points were missing, and both left a deployment unable to do the thing it exists for. `token create|list|revoke` — db/ has had the whole agent-token lifecycle since Phase 1, but nothing called it: no CLI, no page. A fresh instance therefore had no credential for the agent write plane, which refuses an anonymous caller by design, and the only way to mint one was an operator hand-writing an INSERT with a sha256 hash. The plaintext is printed once and never logged; only its hash is stored, and the listing deliberately omits the hash so nobody mistakes it for the credential. `doc propose ~owner/space <file>...` — the two agent write surfaces are remote and so need a bearer token. When the operator and the documents are already on the host, that token is ceremony: the process can open Postgres and the bare repositories directly, so it constructs the agent principal itself rather than resolving one from an agent_token row. Provenance is not waived — --agent and --session are recorded exactly as a remote agent's are, so `git log` cannot tell the two apart, and neither can a reviewer. It calls service.Propose, so If-Match, the branch cut, the trailers and the auto-merge gate stay spelled once. Flags parse before, after and between the positionals: Go's flag package stops at the first non-flag, which would make `doc propose ~bigbes/rfcs spec.md --title x` drop --title and fail one layer down complaining about a missing title rather than the flag it ignored. spec-rsb, spec-ovo