login: take the unified-login cookie decode from ecore
authn's CookieName, the fernet decrypt, the auth.AuthCookie unmarshal and the
empty-name check were one of six copies of the same decode on this instance.
They are now sr-ht-ecore/login.UsernameFromRequest; what stays here is the half
that is ours, turning that name into a row in our user table.
Two things the local copy did not do. It passed the cookie's name through with
a leading '~' still on it, which meta answers for nobody, and it validated
nothing at all — a name went from an attacker-supplied cookie straight into a
GraphQL query and a log line. Both are now login's, and the middleware's own
rule is unchanged: every failure is anonymity, so public browsing and public
clones keep working.
authn: cookie, PAT, and dolt-JWT caller resolution
Add the authn package resolving the SourceHut caller across dolt.sr.ht's
three auth flows, producing core-go *auth.AuthContext values mapped onto the
pure core.Caller domain type:
- ctx.go: WithCaller/CallerFromContext (nil for anonymous, never panics) and
AsCoreCaller (maps UserType, derives Suspended).
- cookie.go: OptionalCookieMiddleware, the never-rejecting unified-login
cookie reader (fernet decrypt -> {name} -> LookupUser); any failure degrades
to anonymous so public browsing keeps working.
- token.go: ResolveBasic, the meta personal-access-token trio (offline
DecodeBearerToken -> username match -> LookupUser + revocation) with a 60s
positive cache keyed by sha512(password); TokenGrantsAllow gates
dolt.sr.ht/repos RO/RW grants (empty grants pass).
- jwt.go: ResolveDoltJWT, EdDSA JWS verification for dolt keypair auth (kid ->
KeyStore pubkey, alg=EdDSA, aud/exp/sub checked, iss ignored), reusing
dolt's creds.PubKeyToKIDStr for the kid<->pubkey integrity check.
- grpc.go: ResolveGRPCAuth dispatching Basic/Bearer/anonymous.
Meta lookup + revocation sit behind the MetaBackend interface and JWT keys
behind the KeyStore interface (implemented later by db/), so tests forge
cookies (fernet), PATs (BearerToken.Encode) and real Ed25519 JWTs against
in-memory stubs with no network or Postgres.