feat: service.Archive — one accessor, one tree walk, one link graph

web/ and mcpsrv/ both needed a *doc.Archive and each invented its own way
to get one. web/ handed sp.Repo to doc.Scan — reaching past service/ into
gitx, which the layering rule forbids — and then listed the documents a
second time for their bodies, two tree walks per page view. mcpsrv/
converted []service.Document back into []gitx.Document, rebuilding hashes
service/ had already stringified. Two workarounds around one missing
accessor is how three agent-facing surfaces stop being identical.

Service.Archive resolves the revision, walks the tree once, and returns
the archive with the bodies. ArchiveFrom is the same construction over a
Document set a caller already holds — the one place a hex object name is
converted back to a hash, malformed ids refused rather than zeroed.

doc.Page.Links and Page.WordCount were documented as "filled in by a
render pass" and nothing filled them, so Archive.Backlinks always
returned empty; web/ worked around that by re-rendering every document of
the space on each page view. doc.Archive.LinkPass now owns the pass and
the accessor runs it, so the link graph exists wherever the archive does.

web/ and mcpsrv/ no longer import gitx or go-git, in tests either.
doc.DirOf replaces the three copies of the same fromDir helper.

feat(mcpsrv): MCP read tools, with Host validation replacing the SDK guard

Adds the Phase 2 read tools (spec_search, spec_read, spec_list) over the
service layer.

Two security fixes came out of building them.

The read plane could serve proposal content. gitx resolves ref names, and
service.resolveRev passed any string through, so rev=proposals/42 made the
READ plane hand back unreviewed text — which would then flow into agent
context as though approved, the single failure this service exists to
prevent. ValidateReadRev now admits only the approved-head sentinel or a
full 40-character object name, at the layer all three surfaces share.
Abbreviations are refused too: one that is unique today can become
ambiguous later, so a pinned revision would silently stop meaning one
thing.

The MCP SDK's DNS-rebinding guard rejects a loopback listener whose Host
is not loopback, which is exactly nginx forwarding to 127.0.0.1 — it would
403 only in production, passing every local test. The SDK offers no
allowlist, so the guard is disabled and replaced by a stricter check: Host
must equal the configured origin, or a loopback name for development. A
rebinding attack carries the attacker's name in Host and fails it. An
unusable origin logs loudly rather than quietly unguarding the endpoint.