~bigbes/sr-ht-spec

ref: 643fa0b5d34a047923791d23f11ab585dd7487d5 sr-ht-spec/authn/resolver_test.go -rw-r--r-- 10.4 KiB
643fa0b5 — Eugene Blikh logging: log through slog and scribe rather than stdlib log 10 days ago
                                                                                
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package authn

import (
	"context"
	"errors"
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"reflect"
	"testing"

	"sourcecraft.dev/bigbes/sr-ht-ecore/bearer"
)

// newTestResolver builds a resolver whose agent plane is wired to a daemon that
// answers "live" — the production shape. The cookie tests present no bearer
// credential and so never reach it.
func newTestResolver(t *testing.T) *Resolver {
	t.Helper()
	return newPlaneFixture(t, http.StatusNoContent).rs
}

func TestNewResolver_RejectsBadWiring(t *testing.T) {
	if _, err := NewResolver(""); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("empty owner must be rejected")
	}
	if _, err := NewResolver("Not A Name"); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("unusable owner must be rejected")
	}
	// The canonical "~user" spelling is accepted and normalised.
	rs, err := NewResolver("~bigbes")
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("NewResolver(~bigbes): %v", err)
	}
	if rs.Owner() != "bigbes" {
		t.Fatalf("Owner() = %q, want %q", rs.Owner(), "bigbes")
	}
}

func TestResolve_OwnerCookie(t *testing.T) {
	f := newPlaneFixture(t, http.StatusNoContent)

	p, err := f.rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request(sealCookie(t, "bigbes"), nil))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
	}
	if !p.IsOwner() {
		t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want the owner", p)
	}
	if p.IsAnonymous() || p.IsAgent() {
		t.Fatalf("owner classified as anonymous/agent: %+v", p)
	}
	if p.Owner != "bigbes" {
		t.Fatalf("Owner = %q, want %q", p.Owner, "bigbes")
	}
	if f.users.calls != 0 || f.daemon.hits != 0 {
		t.Fatal("the cookie path must not touch the agent credential plane")
	}
}

func TestResolve_AbsentCookieIsAnonymousNotAnError(t *testing.T) {
	rs := newTestResolver(t)
	p, err := rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request("", nil))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("an anonymous request must never error: %v", err)
	}
	if !p.IsAnonymous() {
		t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want anonymous", p)
	}
}

func TestResolve_BrokenCookiesAreAnonymousNotErrors(t *testing.T) {
	rs := newTestResolver(t)
	for name, value := range map[string]string{
		"tampered":    tamper(t, sealCookie(t, "bigbes")),
		"garbage":     "not-a-valid-fernet-token",
		"foreign key": sealCookieWithKey(t, &rotatedKey, "bigbes"),
	} {
		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
			p, err := rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request(value, nil))
			if err != nil {
				t.Fatalf("a broken cookie must never error: %v", err)
			}
			if !p.IsAnonymous() {
				t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want anonymous", p)
			}
		})
	}
}

// Single-user: a real user who is not bigbes has nothing granted to them, so
// they read exactly as an anonymous viewer does. The name survives for logs
// only, and must not be mistaken for authority.
func TestResolve_NonOwnerCookieIsAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
	rs := newTestResolver(t)
	p, err := rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request(sealCookie(t, "someone"), nil))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
	}
	if !p.IsAnonymous() {
		t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want anonymous", p)
	}
	if p.IsOwner() {
		t.Fatal("a non-owner cookie must not yield the owner")
	}
	if p.Owner != "" {
		t.Fatalf("Owner = %q, want empty for a non-owner", p.Owner)
	}
	if p.CookieUser != "someone" {
		t.Fatalf("CookieUser = %q, want %q", p.CookieUser, "someone")
	}
}

func TestResolve_AgentTokenAccepted(t *testing.T) {
	f := newPlaneFixture(t, http.StatusNoContent)

	p, err := f.rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request("", map[string]string{
		"Authorization":    "Bearer " + instanceToken("spec:propose spec:read"),
		HeaderAgent:        "claude-code/spec-writer",
		HeaderAgentSession: "8fb9c9a4-b078-4af1-89eb-d97c522f9921",
	}))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
	}
	if !p.IsAgent() {
		t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want an agent", p)
	}
	if p.IsOwner() || p.IsAnonymous() {
		t.Fatalf("agent classified as owner/anonymous: %+v", p)
	}
	if p.Agent != "claude-code/spec-writer" || p.Session != "8fb9c9a4-b078-4af1-89eb-d97c522f9921" {
		t.Fatalf("provenance not carried onto the principal: %+v", p)
	}
	if p.Owner != "bigbes" {
		t.Fatalf("agent acts for %q, want %q", p.Owner, "bigbes")
	}
	if p.TokenName != "tokens.sr.ht (stateless)" {
		t.Fatalf("TokenName = %q, want the tokens.sr.ht label", p.TokenName)
	}
}

// A bearer token wins over a cookie. Letting a stale browser cookie promote a
// token-bearing request to the owner would hand an agent the approved branch.
func TestResolve_BearerBeatsCookie(t *testing.T) {
	f := newPlaneFixture(t, http.StatusNoContent)

	p, err := f.rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request(sealCookie(t, "bigbes"),
		map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer " + instanceToken("spec:propose")}))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatalf("Resolve: %v", err)
	}
	if !p.IsAgent() {
		t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want an agent", p)
	}
	if p.IsOwner() {
		t.Fatal("an owner cookie must not promote a token-bearing request")
	}
}

// A bad token is a hard failure even when a valid owner cookie is present: an
// agent silently downgraded to a reader fails confusingly at its first write
// instead of clearly at the door.
func TestResolve_BadTokenFailsEvenWithOwnerCookie(t *testing.T) {
	f := newPlaneFixture(t, http.StatusNoContent)

	_, err := f.rs.Resolve(context.Background(), request(sealCookie(t, "bigbes"),
		map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer never-issued"}))
	if !errors.Is(err, bearer.ErrInvalid) {
		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want bearer.ErrInvalid", err)
	}
}

func runMiddleware(t *testing.T, rs *Resolver, r *http.Request) (Principal, int, bool) {
	t.Helper()
	var got Principal
	var reached bool
	h := rs.Middleware()(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		reached = true
		got = PrincipalFromContext(r.Context())
	}))
	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
	h.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
	return got, rec.Code, reached
}

func TestMiddleware_AttachesPrincipal(t *testing.T) {
	rs := newTestResolver(t)

	t.Run("owner", func(t *testing.T) {
		p, code, reached := runMiddleware(t, rs, request(sealCookie(t, "bigbes"), nil))
		if !reached || code != http.StatusOK {
			t.Fatalf("reached=%v code=%d, want true/200", reached, code)
		}
		if !p.IsOwner() {
			t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want the owner", p)
		}
	})

	t.Run("anonymous", func(t *testing.T) {
		p, code, reached := runMiddleware(t, rs, request("", nil))
		if !reached || code != http.StatusOK {
			t.Fatalf("reached=%v code=%d, want true/200", reached, code)
		}
		if !p.IsAnonymous() {
			t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want anonymous", p)
		}
	})

	t.Run("agent", func(t *testing.T) {
		p, code, reached := runMiddleware(t, rs, request("", map[string]string{
			"Authorization":    "Bearer " + instanceToken("spec:propose spec:read"),
			HeaderAgent:        "claude-code/spec-writer",
			HeaderAgentSession: "sess-1",
		}))
		if !reached || code != http.StatusOK {
			t.Fatalf("reached=%v code=%d, want true/200", reached, code)
		}
		if !p.IsAgent() || p.Agent != "claude-code/spec-writer" {
			t.Fatalf("principal = %+v, want the agent", p)
		}
	})
}

func TestMiddleware_RejectsBadToken(t *testing.T) {
	rs := newTestResolver(t)
	_, code, reached := runMiddleware(t, rs, request("",
		map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer never-issued"}))
	if reached {
		t.Fatal("a refused token must not reach the handler")
	}
	if code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 401", code)
	}
}

// A user lookup that cannot answer is a backend outage, not a bad credential:
// fail closed with a 503 rather than telling a live agent its token is bad.
func TestMiddleware_BackendOutageIs503(t *testing.T) {
	f := newPlaneFixture(t, http.StatusNoContent)
	f.users.err = errors.New("connection refused")

	_, code, reached := runMiddleware(t, f.rs, request("",
		map[string]string{"Authorization": "Bearer " + instanceToken("spec:read")}))
	if reached {
		t.Fatal("a backend outage must fail closed, not reach the handler")
	}
	if code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
		t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 503", code)
	}
}

// A handler reached without the middleware must degrade to less authority, not
// more.
func TestPrincipalFromContext_BareContextIsAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
	p := PrincipalFromContext(context.Background())
	if !p.IsAnonymous() || p.IsOwner() || p.IsAgent() {
		t.Fatalf("bare context yielded %+v, want anonymous", p)
	}
	if p.Kind != KindAnonymous {
		t.Fatalf("Kind = %q, want %q", p.Kind, KindAnonymous)
	}
}

// Principal is not comparable with == — it carries a grant set — so the round
// trip is asserted with reflect.DeepEqual, which also covers the grants.
func TestPrincipalFromContext_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
	want := Principal{
		Kind: KindAgent, Owner: "bigbes", Agent: "a", Session: "s",
		Plane: PlaneInstance, Grants: mustGrants(t, "spec:read spec:propose"), UserID: 3,
	}
	got := PrincipalFromContext(WithPrincipal(context.Background(), want))
	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
		t.Fatalf("round trip = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
	}
}

// The zero Principal must be the anonymous one — an unrecognised Kind is denied
// rather than accidentally admitted.
func TestPrincipal_ZeroValueIsAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
	var p Principal
	if !p.IsAnonymous() || p.IsOwner() || p.IsAgent() {
		t.Fatalf("zero Principal = %+v, want anonymous", p)
	}
	if p2 := (Principal{Kind: Kind("nonsense")}); !p2.IsAnonymous() {
		t.Fatal("an unrecognised Kind must be anonymous")
	}
}

func TestPrincipal_String(t *testing.T) {
	// A slice and not a map keyed by Principal: it carries a grant set and is
	// therefore not comparable.
	cases := []struct {
		p    Principal
		want string
	}{
		{Anonymous(), "anonymous"},
		{Principal{Kind: KindAnonymous, CookieUser: "someone"}, "anonymous (cookie user ~someone)"},
		{Principal{Kind: KindOwner, Owner: "bigbes"}, "owner ~bigbes"},
		{
			Principal{Kind: KindAgent, Owner: "bigbes", Agent: "claude-code/spec-writer", Session: "s-1"},
			"agent claude-code/spec-writer session s-1 for ~bigbes",
		},
		{Principal{Kind: KindAgent, Owner: "bigbes"}, "agent (unnamed) session (no session) for ~bigbes"},
		// An agent a local process asserted (the CLI) carries no credential and
		// so no grant set: the annotation appears only where there is something
		// to say.
		{
			Principal{Kind: KindAgent, Owner: "bigbes", Agent: "a", Session: "s-1"},
			"agent a session s-1 for ~bigbes",
		},
		{
			Principal{
				Kind: KindAgent, Owner: "bigbes", Agent: "a", Session: "s-1",
				Plane: PlaneInstance, Grants: mustGrants(t, "spec:propose"),
			},
			"agent a session s-1 for ~bigbes (tokens.sr.ht: spec:propose)",
		},
	}
	for _, c := range cases {
		if got := c.p.String(); got != c.want {
			t.Fatalf("String() = %q, want %q", got, c.want)
		}
	}
}